Approved For Release 2001/09/04 CIA-RDP88-00374R000100280013-6

15 March 1955

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Clark Committee Briefings; 9:30 - 12:30

G.A.O. Building, 25 March 1955

- The Clark Task Force has requested a briefing for 23 March 1955. They have indicated the following specific questions which they want answered and have indicated there will be questions on other matters. The Director has indicated that he will answer most of the questions, but in certain instances will call on specific individuals to fill in details. Consequently, it is requested that briefing notes be prepared for each question, and that a copy of the notes be handed to the official indicated who may be called on to supplement the Director.
- 2. It is requested that the Action Officer designated to prepare the briefing notes on the questions pertaining to the Clandestine Services start each answer on a separate page. Each answer to be triple-spaced and not to exceed three pages. After approval by DD/P, the item will be condensed to one page or less. Short, tersely written paragraphs are desired.
- Answers should be delivered by close of business, 15 March 1955, and in any event, not later than noon, 16 March 1955.

4. The schedule for the use of these notes: DD/P - 16 March: IG - 17 March: DCI - 18 March.

Questions with Action Officer Indicated

- What do we know of Soviet intentions? Borel to get answer; ì. Amory to get copy of answer.
- 2. The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) -- your role and mission in it; its relationship to CLA operations? to got answer.

ACTION 25X1A

3. What intelligence do we give to the President and high policy officials? Borel to get answer.

25X1A

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Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP88-00374R000100280013-6 CECRET Discussion of the value of National Intelligence Estimates? How 1. do we influence policy? Borel to get answer; Amory to get copy of answer. to get 25X1A 5. What particular intelligence successes have we had? answer; Wisner/Helms to get copy of answer. ACTION: 25X1A The work of the Watch Committee and its reports? Borel to get 6. answer; DDCI to get copy of answer. 7. In your experience, is the wide authority given your Agency in Public Law 110 essential for all activities, especially in personnel, procurement and fiscal accounting? White to get answer; White to get copy of answer. 8. The Task Force has heard of CIA as the "Fourth Force": An elaboration of the philosophy behind this is desired? answer; DDCI to get copy of answer. ACTION: 25X1A Development of a cold war project -- standards by which allocations of 9. funds are made for various projects and how the amount needed is determined, by whom and what checks are made? The role of CLA in recent incident? to get answer; Wiener to get 25X1A copy of answer. 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A ACTION: 25X1A Ideas as to future plans in various areas; namely, whether or not an 10. 25X1A expansion, contraction, elimination, or change is contemplated in 25X1A such stations as to get answer: Helms to get copy of answer. 25X1A ACTION: 25X1A 11.

25X1A

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| 1 2. 25X1A | In some areas in the field, the Task Force representatives encountered an apparent belief that collection of "military intelligence" was of secondary importance to your Agency representatives. A comment on this is requested? |
| | ACTION: 25X1A |
| 13. 25X1A | A comment on relationship between CIA and State Department at desk level? The to get answer; Helms to get copy of answer. |
| 25/1/ | ACTION: 25X1A |
| 1 4. 25X1A | A community on the interchange of information at theater command level with reference to assets and capabilities, as distinct from sources, is desired? To get asswer: Wisner to get copy of answer. |
| | 25X1A ACTION: |
| 15. | A discussion of the "veto" power of various desk assignments in Washington? i.e., Can a desk officer veto a project submitted from the Washington? i.e., Can a desk officer veto a project submitted from the Washington? i.e., Can a desk officer veto a project submitted from the Washington? At what level can it be turned down? ACTION: |
| 16. | A discussion of the proportion of time or assets which should be devoted towards production and that devoted to administration or support? White to get answer. |
| 17. | Your views on the establishment of a Congressional "Watch Dog" Committee for CIA? Eirlepatrick to get answer. 25X1A |
| 1 6. 25X1A | |
| 19 | |
| 25X1A 20 | Your views as to how more positive information can be collected from to get answer. |
| | China and USSR? 25X1A ACTION: 25X1A |
| | FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS); |

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- 8. The Task Force has heard of CEA as the "Fourth Force;" an elaboration of the philosophy behind this is desired.
 - 1. The term "Fourth Force" results from an agreement between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the DCI which details the wartime command relationships between CIA and the Armed Forces in the field of Unconventional Warfare. This agreement, titled "Command Relationships Between CIA and the Armed Forces in Active Theaters of War Where American Forces Are Engaged," provides that: (a) CIA will retain its organisational integrity insofer as is practicable, including costrol of technical and special administrative matters; (b) The CIA Force assigned to a Commander of a Command established by the JCS will be under the immediate command of a marker of CIA designated by the DCI and acceptable to the military commander; (c) Two Commander of a unified or specified command will emercise authority ever CTA Unconventional Marfare forces assigned to his eres corresponding to that exercised over the Army, Marvel, and Air Force component forces similarly assigned. In other words, CIA will become in wartime the fourth component force of the thester commender.

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- 2. The lack of a clear understanding of the command relationship between the Office of Strategic Services and the Armed Forces Suring World War II and the misunderstandings resulting therefrom were factors which contributed to the development of the agreed command relationship in wartime.
- 3. A major factor which necessitates CIA's retention of its organizational integrity is the need for the U.S. to maintain an effective national clandestine intelligence service both in periods of peace and war. To meet this requirement the United States must develop and maintain a national clandestine intelligence service which in time of war is geared to meet the needs of the military and still be in a position to perform its clandestine intelligence functions in the post war years in support of national policies.

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- 14. A comment on the interchange of information at theater command level with reference to assets and capabilities, as distinct from sources, is desired?
 - 1. In order to provide for the interchange of information at theater 25X1A

commend level, CIA maintains officers on the staffs 25X1A

25X1A

These officers are integrated into the theater planning

structure and are responsible for assisting in war planning and for advising the CDECs with respect to CDA assets and capabilities in planning and preparation for warking operations. Officers, so assigned, receive guidance from the War Flans Group of the CDA Senior War Flanner whose sees of responsibility is coveredness with that of the CDEC concerned. These Senior War Flanners and the War Flans Groups prepare the CDA theater war plans which are in constraince with and complementary to the military commander's plans. For example, the CDA planners, in many cases, collaborate with the military planners to the extent of recommending geographic agess in which clandestine action is potentially must favorable. This information in turn is used, where

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femalble, so the basis for the military requirement for CIA wartime operations.

2. Information concerning assets and capabilities for "Cold Wer" operations is not released to the military at theater level except on a "need-to-know" basis as provided for in NSC 5412.

approved for release PROGRAM of the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 5/5/92 HRD 8-9-2

15 March 1955

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Clark Committee Briefings; 9:30 - 12:30 G.A.O. Building, 23 March 1955

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- 3. Answers should be delivered to by close of business, 15 March 1955, and in any event, not later than noon, 16 March 1955.
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Questions with Action Officer Indicated

- What do we know of Soviet intentions? Berel to get answer;
 Amory to get copy of answer.
- The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) -- your role and mission in it; its relationship to CIA operations?

ACTION -


3. What intelligence do we give to the President and high policy officials?
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
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- Discussion of the value of National Intelligence Estimates? How do we influence policy? Borel to get answer; Amory to get copy of answer.
- 5. What particular intelligence successes have we had? to get answer: Wiener/Helms to get copy of answer.



- The work of the Watch Committee and its reports? Borel to get answer; DDCI to get copy of answer.
- 7. In your experience, is the wide authority given your Agency is Public Law 110 essential for all activities, especially in personnel, procurement and fiscal accounting? White to get answer; White to get copy of answer.
- 8. The Task Force has heard of CIA as the "Fourth Force"; An elaboration of the philosophy behind this is desired? to get answer; DDCI to get copy of answer.



9. Development of a cold war project -- standards by which allocations of funds are made for various projects and how the amount needed is determined, by whom and what checks are made? The role of CIA in recent incident? to get answer; Wiener to get copy of answer.


ACTION:

10. Ideas as to future plans in various areas; namely, whether or not an expansion, contraction, elimination, or change is contemplated in such stations as

answer; Helms to get copy of answer.

ACTION:

ACTION:



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| 12. | In some areas in the field, the Task Force representatives encountered an apparent belief that collection of "military intelligence" was of secondary importance to your Agency representatives. A comment on this is requested? |
| | ACTION: |
| 13. | A comment on relationship between CIA and State Department at desk level? To get answer; Helms to get copy of answer. |
| | ACTION: |
| 14. | A commend on the interchange of information at theater command level with reference to assets and capabilities, as distinct from sources, is desired? To get answer; Wisner to get copy of answer. |
| | ACTION: |
| 15. | A discussion of the "vete" power of various desk assignments in Washington? i.e., Can a desk officer vete a project submitted from the field? At what level can it be turned down? |
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| 16. | A discussion of the proportion of time or assets which should be devoted towards production and that devoted to administration or support? White to get answer. |
| 17. | Your views on the establishment of a Congressional "Watch Dog" Committee for CIA? Kirkpatrick to get answer. |
| 18. | ACTION: |
| 19. | And the second of the second o |
| | ACTION: |
| 20. | Your views as to how more positive information can be collected from China and USSR? The state to get answer. |
| | ACTION: |
| | FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS); |
| | |

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- 8. The Task Force has heard of CIA as the "Fourth Force;" an elaboration of the philosophy behind this is desired.
 - 1. The term "Fourth Force" results from an agreement between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the DCI which details the wartime command relationships between CIA and the Armed Forces in the field of Unconventional Warfare. This agreement, titled "Command Relationships Between CIA and the Armed Forces in Active Theaters of War Where American Forces Are Engaged," provides that: (a) CIA will retain its organizational integrity insofer as is practicable, including control of technical and special administrative matters; (b) The CIA Force assigned to a Commander of a Command established by the JCS will be under the immediate command of a member of CIA designated by the DCI and acceptable to the military commander: (c) The Commander of a unified or specified command will exercise authority over CIA Unconventional Warfare forces assigned to his erea corresponding to that exercised over the Army, Mavel, and Air Porce component forces similarly assigned. In other words, CIA will become in wartime the fourth component force of the theater commander.

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- 2. The lack of a clear understanding of the command relationship between the Office of Strategic Services and the Armed Forces during World War II and the misunderstandings resulting therefrom were factors which contributed to the development of the agreed command relationship in wartime.
- organizational integrity is the need for the U.S. to maintain an effective national clandestine intelligence service both in periods of peace and war. To meet this requirement the United States must develop and maintain a national clandestine intelligence service which in time of war is geared to meet the needs of the military and still be in a position to perform its clandestine intelligence functions in the post war years in support of national policies.

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- 14. A comment on the interchange of information at theater command level with reference to assets and capabilities, as distinct from sources, is desired?
 - 1. In order to provide for the interchange of information at theater command level, CIA maintains officers on the staffs

These officers are integrated into the theater planning structure and are responsible for assisting in war planning and for advising the CINCs with respect to CIA assets and capabilities in planning and preparation for wartime operations. Officers, so assigned, receive guidance from the Wor Flans Group of the CIA Senior War Flanmer whose area of responsibility is cotermineus with that of the CIRC concerned. These Senior Wer Planners and the War Plans Groups prepare the CIA theater war plans which are in consonance with and complementary to the military commander's plans. For example, the CIA planners, in many cases, collaborate with the military planners to the extent of recommending geographic areas in which claudestine action is potentially most favorable. This information in turn is used, where

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feasible, as the basis for the military requirement for CIA wartime operations.

2. Information concerning assets and capabilities for "Cold War" operations is not released to the military at theater level except on a "need-to-know" basis as provided for in NSC 5412.